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Case Commentry
Judgment of the German
Constitutional Court
on the (un)constitutionality
of welfare sanctions BVerfG,
05.11.2019  1 BvL 7/16
Valery Gantchev
University of Groningen, the Netherlands
Introduction
On 5 November 2019, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht,
BverfG) announced its landmark judgment on the constitutionality of welfare sanctions in the
German social assistance scheme known as Hartz IV.1 The decision demolished a big portion of
the applicable sanctioning regime after the Court unanimously found that the mandatory reduction
of welfare benefits is in grave violation of the constitutionally guaranteed subsistence minimum.
The long-awaited judgment is expected to shape social assistance in Germany for years to come,
and it will most likely also have a reflective impact at an international level. The following
discussion provides an overview of the facts of the case, the normative constitutional requirements
and the judgment itself. The final part sketches a conclusion and future outlook.
Facts of the case
The case started in 2014, when the body responsible for the administration of Hartz IV benefits
(Jobcenter) reduced the benefits of an unemployed individual for refusing to comply with the
claimant obligations. The man, who had previously been trained as a warehouse worker, rejected
an invitation by the Jobcenter to apply for an open position at a warehouse. He said he was no
longer interested in working in a warehouse and wanted to find a job as a shop assistant instead.
The Jobcenter decided that this refusal constituted a violation of the duty to cooperate by accepting
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suitable employment and imposed a sanction of 30 per cent reduction of the man’s benefit. Several
months later, the Jobcenter approached the unemployed man with a reintegration plan that would
enable him to do an internship as a shop assistant in order to obtain the necessary work experience.
The man again refused to follow up on the plan, and the Jobcenter imposed a higher 60 per cent
sanction for repeated non-compliance with the duty to cooperate. The man challenged both deci-
sions of the Jobcenter in front of the Social Court in Gotha (SG Gotha) on the grounds that the
sanctioning regime in Hartz IV is unconstitutional. The SG Gotha expressed its doubts about the
constitutionality of the applicable rules and decided to refer the case to the Constitutional Court
using the procedure which allows all national courts to challenge acts of parliaments in front of the
country’s highest court.2 In May 2016, the Constitutional Court declared the case non-admissible3
due to a procedural technicality: The SG Gotha had failed to establish whether the sanctioned
individual was informed of the legal consequences of non-compliance. In other words, it was not
clear whether the sanction was imposed in accordance with the law. Normally, this would have
been a dead-end for the constitutional examination in the present case. However, the SG Gotha
adopted a surprising approach. It invited the sanctioned person to a court hearing where it asked
him whether he was aware of the consequences, and the man confirmed that he was very much
aware of the existing threat of sanctions. Having established that the person was in possession of
the required information, the SG Gotha referred the case to the Constitutional Court for a second
time, because it was ‘convinced’4 of the unconstitutionality of the sanctioning regime.
The basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum
The constitutional review of German welfare sanctions was based on the standards of protection
established by the basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum. This unwritten basic right was
developed by the judiciary over the decades as a derivative of human dignity and the social state
principle (Articles 1(1) and 20(1) of the German Constitution).5 The right to a guaranteed sub-
sistence minimum has a mixed character. On the one hand, it constitutes a direct, subjective right
which entitles individuals to minimum levels of public support. On the other hand, it is an overly
abstract right that requires concretisation by the legislator for its application in practice. Generally
speaking, the Constitutional Court awards the national parliament a wide margin of appreciation
when implementing social assistance measures that provide the realisation of this basic right.
The right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum secures the means that are necessary for
securing the physical existence of individuals (food, clothing, accommodation, heating, hygiene
and health) and for enabling basic participation in social, cultural and political life. The right
assumes an obligation by the state to provide support to citizens who do not dispose of the required
means. This duty to provide, however, may come into conflict with another state duty – to promote
reintegration into paid employment. This is especially true in the current landscape where the
legislator has decided to promote reintegration by using the threat of welfare sanctions. In the
present case, the Constitutional Court attempted to balance out the strained relationship between
welfare sanctions and the guaranteed existence minimum.
2. In German this procedure is known as konkrete Normenkontrolle, cf. Article 100(1) German Constitution.
3. BVerfG 26.05.2016, 1 BvL 7/15.
4. BVerfG 05.11.2019, 1 BvL 7/16, § 81.
5. Ibid, §§ 118-128.
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The judgment of the German federal constitutional court
a). The effectiveness of welfare sanctions and inconsistent practice
After providing a detailed overview of the applicable legal rules and their historical background,
the Constitutional Court made several important preliminary observations on the effectiveness of
sanctions and their application in practice.6 § 55 SGB II formulates the obligation of the German
government to examine the effects of the provision of social assistance benefits on a regular basis.
The Court pointed out that, in spite of this state duty, to date there has been no comprehensive
examination of the effects of the German welfare conditionality regime in §§ 31, 31a, 31b SGB II.
The Court referred to the handful of German empirical studies on the effectiveness of sanctions
with the remark that these studies are inconsistent with respect to their methods, how representa-
tive they are, and their results. Accordingly, the judges noted that there is no empirical evidence
that the threat of sanctions has a positive effect on promoting compliance with the duty to
cooperate. On the contrary, some studies point towards the conclusion that sanctions may be
counter-productive for the social reintegration of unemployed individuals and highlight the dan-
gers of pushing vulnerable people into isolation, destitution, homelessness or survival crime and
further distancing them from the services of the Jobcenter.
Furthermore, the German Constitutional Court highlighted the inconsistent sanctioning prac-
tices in Hartz IV by referring to empirical research which suggests that the biggest factor behind the
question of whether a sanction is imposed in an individual case is the particular Jobcenter which
administers the claim. In many cases, Jobcenters are reported to award themselves legally non-
existent discretion by not imposing mandatory sanctions in cases where they are expected to have
the counter-productive effect of increasing individual hardship.7
b). Constitutional review of welfare sanctions
i). Introduction. At the centre of the judicial review was the constitutionality of the German welfare
sanctions laid down in §§ 31a(1), 31b SGB II.8 Under the contested legislation, non-compliance
with the duty to cooperate must at all times be punished by a reduction in welfare benefits. The
amount of the reduction is 30 per cent for first offenders and 60 per cent or 100 per cent in cases of
recidivism. All sanctions are imposed for a period of three months. As noted earlier, the choice of
the legislator to punish non-compliance by (partially) withdrawing welfare benefits conflicts with
the constitutionally guaranteed subsistence minimum. The Constitutional Court approached this
tension in a careful yet firm manner. It began by reaffirming the wide margin of appreciation which
is awarded to the federal parliament in implementing social assistance. This discretion allows the
legislator to choose how to translate the abstract requirements of the right to a guaranteed sub-
sistence minimum into practice. The Court also confirmed that a sanctions-based system which
promotes compliance through the use of negative incentives pursues legitimate purposes. When it
comes to the question of the proportionality of benefit reductions, however, the available leeway
for the legislator quickly narrows down. The reason for this is the impact of benefit sanctions on the
constitutionally guaranteed minimum. The limited margin of appreciation of parliament
6. Ibid, §§ 57-67.
7. Ibid, § 67.
8. Ibid, §§ 153-209.
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corresponds to a higher degree of judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court subjected benefit
contested sanctions to a strict proportionality test and carefully examined whether they are suit-
able, necessary and reasonable. Three important aspects of the benefits sanctions are scrutinised:
their severity, their mandatory nature and their duration.
ii). The severity of the sanction. The Constitutional Court examined the three levels of sanctions
separately, being more lenient in its review of the 30 per cent benefits reduction and becoming
increasingly rigorous when examining the 60 per cent and 100 per cent sanctions.9 The main point
of concern which cast its shadow on the proportionality test relates to the effectiveness of the
sanctions which, as the Court noted in an earlier part of the judgment, is still not justified by any
comprehensive empirical research. Against this background, the suitability and necessity of ben-
efits reductions as reasonable measures for promoting compliance in social assistance remains just
an assumption. In the context of the 30 per cent benefits reduction, the Court displayed a readiness
to accept such an assumption. The violation of the subsistence minimum remains here within
limits, and the legislator has sufficient discretion to base this measure on a ‘prognostic estimation’
of its effectiveness. This, however, does not apply to the 60 per cent and 100 per cent sanctions.
According to the Court, these measures create an extraordinary level of hardship for the sanctioned
individuals. Considering the low level of benefits under Hartz IV which, as the Court noted, are
‘barely sufficient’ to cover the constitutionally guaranteed minimum in the first place,10 a reduc-
tion of this extent clearly deprives individuals of their means of subsistence. This motivated the
Court to carry out a very strict proportionality test. Against the background of such a grave
interference with the protected basic right, the legislator can no longer rely on the plausible
assumption that the measures are effective. In the absence of any empirical research, the Court
based its judgment on currently available insights, according to which reductions in benefit are not
only ineffective but may also be counter-productive. A reduction of 60 per cent or more can have a
devastating effect on the most vulnerable groups of sanctioned individuals, thus pushing them into
high debt, survival crime and homelessness, and they may drop out of the social protection system
all-together.
The Court reached the conclusion that the 60 per cent and 100 per cent benefits reductions do
not satisfy the strict requirements of the proportionality test. These sanctions are neither necessary
nor suitable for promoting reintegration by creating incentives for compliance, and, in individual
cases, they can even lead to social exclusion. Accordingly, the Court declared that these provisions
are unconstitutional and conferred on the legislator the duty to adopt new legislation to replace
them. In the meantime, Jobcenters are no longer allowed to punish (repeated) non-compliance by
reducing benefit levels by more than 30 per cent.
iii). The mandatory nature of the sanction. The second aspect of German welfare sanctions which was
examined critically in the present judgment is their mandatory nature.11 The contested legislation
does not leave any margin of discretion to Jobcenters to refrain from imposing a sanction in the
event of non-compliance and every breach of cooperation duties must be punished with a benefit
sanction. This approach was found to be insufficiently flexible and to give rise to the inconsistent
9. 30 per cent sanction: Ibid, §§ 158-188; 60 per cent sanction: Ibid, §§ 189-200; 100 per cent sanction: Ibid, §§ 201-209.
10. Ibid, § 190.
11. Ibid, §§ 176, 181, 184-185, 207.
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practice described earlier. In the eyes of the Court, Jobcenters should be able to decide against
imposing a sanction when the circumstances of the case demand this. The Court pointed out that
reducing the benefits of people with psychological problems or individuals who are hardly employ-
able is ineffective and contrary to the aim of reintegration. Accordingly, the Court found that the
mandatory nature of the sanctions in § 31(1) SGB II failed every step of the proportionality test.
The legislator had several possible courses of action: it could adopt discretionary clauses allowing
Jobcenters to refrain from imposing sanctions that would obviously be ineffective, or introduce a
hardship clause which spared the sanction in individual cases to avoid personal hardship.12 Until
the legislator has remedied the unconstitutionality of the provision, the Court announced that §
31(1) must be interpreted in a way that includes both a discretionary clause and a hardship clause.
iv). The duration of the sanction. Finally, the federal constitutional court addressed the duration of
benefit sanctions reduction which is set at three months.13 The judges expressed their scepticism
with regard to the fixed duration. Once again, the legislative framework was found to be insuffi-
ciently flexible to cater to the needs of individual cases. It created no incentives for sanctioned
individuals to alter their behaviour and become compliant before the sanction was lifted. Instead of
promoting compliance with claimant duties, lengthy sanctions can create disincentives and even
cause unemployed individuals to terminate their contact with the Jobcenter.
Against this background, the Court did not accept that the fixed duration of three months is
necessary or suitable for achieving the aim of the sanction. The constitutional requirements allow
the state to withhold the provision of the guaranteed minimum only when and insofar unemployed
individuals do not comply with their duty to cooperate.14 Having failed the proportionality test, the
Court declared that the duration of sanctions was unconstitutional and decided to inject a repara-
tion clause into the respective provision. Under this clause, the Jobcenter can suspend the effect of
the sanction before the three months in cases where sanctioned individuals have declared that they
are ‘seriously and sustainably’ willing to fulfil their claimant duties.
Conclusion and future outlook
The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court is a remarkable contribution to the rights-based
approach to social assistance in Germany. The Court did not hesitate to set clear boundaries to the
wide discretion of the federal parliament in cases where the adopted measures deprive individuals
of the constitutionally-guaranteed subsistence minimum. The Court confirmed that claimant duties
and benefit sanctions are not, in principle, incompatible with the right to a guaranteed subsistence
minimum. However, a more rigorous examination of the proportionality of these measures is
mandated to the extent that their impact on protected human rights is a matter of greater concern.
In the light of the proportionality test, the Court highlighted the importance of examining the
effects of the adopted policies on vulnerable groups. Far-reaching reductions in benefits must be
supported by clear empirical research evidence that they contribute to the reintegration of the
unemployed. This requirement feeds back to the primary aim of social assistance and limits the
discretion of the state to adopt welfare conditionality for purely symbolic or paternalistic purposes.
12. Ibid, § 185.
13. Ibid, §§ 177, 181, 184, 208.
14. Ibid, § 133.
382 European Journal of Social Security 21(4)
A possible by-product of this judgment may be the first comprehensive empirical research on the
effects of welfare sanctions in German social assistance.
Finally, the judgment of the Constitutional Court demonstrates the role of mitigation clauses as
vital tools for keeping the effects of sanctions consistent with the aim of social reintegration.
Discretionary clauses, hardship clauses and reparation clauses allow welfare administrators to
mitigate the negative effects of sanctions in cases where the measures are counter-productive for
the reintegration of vulnerable individuals.
At the international level, the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court will not go unnoticed.
While the concepts of a guaranteed subsistence minimum and mitigation clauses will not be new
for the international legal order15 or for the academic community,16 the expectation is that this
most recent judgment will catalyse the debate on the development of more comprehensive stan-
dards of minimum social protection.
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